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THE STATE OF AFFAIRS REGARDING COUNSELING FOR 
EXPECTANT PARENTS OF A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY: DO 
ACOG’S NEW PRACTICE GUIDELINES SIGNIFY THE ARRIVAL 
OF A BRAVE NEW WORLD? 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been born with 
even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the 
philosophers and the theologians.  Surely the law can assert no competence to 
resolve the issue, particularly in view of the very nearly uniform high value 
which the law and mankind has placed on human life, rather than its absence.1 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act2 (ADA), 
inspiring the “genuine hope that people with disabilities could participate 
equally and be welcomed in all aspects of American life.”3  Passage of the 
ADA was brought about by significant contributions from the disabled 
community.4  The ADA was particularly significant because “[d]emands for 
true integration and acceptance replaced those for mere tolerance, and the goal 
looked to be achievable.”5 
To what degree has this integration and acceptance taken place?  The tort 
actions of wrongful birth and wrongful life indicate that there is much work 
left to be done in the realm of promoting equality for, and eliminating 
discrimination towards, persons with disabilities.  Wrongful birth and wrongful 
life suits are a “unique subset of medical malpractice claims arising from a 
defendant’s negligent failure to inform potential parents of the risk that their 
offspring may suffer from a congenital defect.”6  In both wrongful birth and 
wrongful life tort actions, the parents bringing suit are necessarily required to 
avow that they would have aborted their fetus had they known of their now-
 
 1. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978). 
 2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213 (2006)). 
 3. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 
40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141 (2005). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Darpana N. Sheth, Better Off Unborn? An Analysis of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life 
Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 73 TENN. L. REV. 641, 644 (2006). 
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living7 child’s congenital condition.8  The actionable injury in parents’9 
wrongful birth lawsuits is their lost choice of whether or not to carry their 
unborn child to term, given their hypothetical knowledge that the child would 
be impaired.10  The legal theory in a wrongful life suit, similar to that of a 
wrongful birth suit, is that the child, often via his guardian, asserts that he 
would not have been born but for the health care provider’s negligent failure to 
inform his parents of his potential congenital condition.11  The “operable 
injury” in a wrongful life tort action is the life of the child itself.12  Both 
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits can hardly be reconciled with the goals 
and promises of the ADA.13 
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
recently issued a Practice Bulletin regarding guidelines (Practice Guidelines) 
for screening for fetal chromosomal abnormalities such as Down syndrome.14  
The essence of the Practice Guidelines is that women of all ages should now 
be offered both first trimester aneuploidy screening and amniocentesis 
 
 7. It seems theoretically possible to sustain such a claim if the child has deceased.  It is 
necessary, however, for the child to have been born. 
 8. There is some confusion surrounding the distinction between “wrongful conception” and 
“wrongful birth” claims.  Some scholars define wrongful birth claims as only applicable to claims 
that require parents to avow that they would have had an abortion had they known of their fetus’ 
congenital condition.  See, e.g., Michelle McEntire, Comment, Compensating Post-Conception 
Prenatal Medical Malpractice While Respecting Life: A Recommendation to North Carolina 
Legislators, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 761, 764 (2007) (noting that the injury in a claim for wrongful 
birth is the plaintiff-parents’ deprivation of “the right to choose whether to terminate the 
pregnancy”).  Others include in the larger category of wrongful birth the claims mentioned above, 
but also claims against a geneticist who failed to advise parents of their risk of bearing a child 
with a disability before conception.  See, e.g., Sheth, supra note 6, at 645; Kathleen A. Mahoney, 
Note, Malpractice Claims Resulting from Negligent Preconception Genetic Testing: Do These 
Claims Present a Strain of Wrongful Birth or Wrongful Conception, and Does the Categorization 
Even Matter?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 773, 775 (2006).  For purposes of this Comment, the latter 
claims are defined as “wrongful conception” claims and, thus, largely outside the scope of this 
Comment.  In this Comment, wrongful birth claims are defined much as they are by the Missouri 
legislature: “No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages based on 
the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.”  MO. 
REV. STAT. § 188.130(b) (2000); see also Mahoney, supra (discussing Minnesota’s similar 
statutory ban of wrongful birth claims). 
 9. A wrongful birth lawsuit may be brought by either or both parents.  23 CAUSES OF 
ACTION SECOND § 4, at 55 (Dana Campbell & Clark Kimball eds., 2003). 
 10. Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1103–04, 1115 (Md. 2002); see also Hensel, supra 
note 3, at 142 (discussing the development of wrongful birth claims). 
 11. Kassama, 792 A.2d at 1115; see Hensel, supra note 3, at 143. 
 12. Hensel, supra note 3, at 143; see Kassama, 792 A.2d at 1116. 
 13. See e.g., Hensel, supra note 2, at 141 (noting that the “excitement and optimism” that 
ensued the passage of the ADA “has since diminished). 
 14. ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 77: Screening for Fetal Chromosomal Abnormalities, 109 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 217 (2007) [hereinafter ACOG 77]. 
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examinations.15  These Practice Guidelines form the basis for the clinical 
recommendations given by obstetricians and gynecologists across the country.  
The abortion rate for fetuses with Down syndrome, among women who have 
chosen to have such testing, is estimated to be between eighty and ninety 
percent.16  The increased number of fetal chromosomal abnormalities being 
diagnosed due to the promulgation of these Practice Guidelines teamed with 
the current abortion rate for fetuses with such a diagnosis inevitably results in a 
drastically increased number of abortions of fetuses diagnosed with a 
disability, and has led to an eight percent decrease in the Down syndrome 
population in the last two decades.17  Increased testing and, more arguably, 
increased termination of fetuses with congenital conditions, may be in part due 
to increased liability—or perceived liability—resulting from the availability of 
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits.18 
With an increased focus on identifying congenital conditions in the womb 
and a staggering abortion rate of fetuses with such conditions, one would 
expect that—at the very least—expectant parents would be getting the proper 
information regarding the life aspirations and achievements of individuals with 
disabilities.  Unfortunately, all too often this is not the case.19  State and federal 
legislators have responded to this “Brave New World” where fetuses are 
aborted by parents who have not been given information and counseling that 
may have been valuable in their difficult decision-making process.  The 
Missouri legislature recently passed Missouri House Bill 818, or Section 
191.923 of the Missouri Code, mandating informed genetic counseling for 
expectant parents of a child with a disability.20  In 2007, Senator Brownback 
introduced legislation, co-sponsored by Senator Kennedy, called the Prenatally 
and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, containing many of the 
same recommendations.21  Congressman Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin 
 
 15. Id. at 219. 
 16. Nancy Cambria, Laws Mandate Data on Down, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 9, 
2008, at A1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 142 & n.7; see also Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group 
v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 563 (Ga. 1990) (“[W]ith the continued advances in medical science 
which are occurring daily, the problems presented by the concept of ‘wrongful birth’ actions can 
only become increasingly more numerous and more complex.”); Mark F. Grady, Better Medicine 
Causes More Lawsuits, and New Administrative Courts Will Not Solve the Problem, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1068, 1070–71 (1992) (book review) (arguing that improvements in technology generally 
increase negligent behavior). 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. H.B. 818, 94th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008) (codified at MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 191.923 (Supp. 2008)). 
 21. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, S. 1810, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (as introduced in the Senate, July 18, 2007). 
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introduced the companion version of the bill in the House of Representatives.22  
Congress recently passed this federal legislation (the Prenatally and Postnatally 
Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act) on September 25, 2008, by a voice 
vote,23 and the bill was signed into law by President Bush on October 8, 
2008.24 
This author believes that legislation similar to Section 191.923 of the 
Missouri Code and the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions 
Awareness Act is necessary both to eliminate the legal threat of wrongful birth 
and wrongful life actions and to facilitate adequate and accurate genetic 
counseling for expectant parents of children with disabilities. 
Although a woman’s right to procreative choice, including access to an 
abortion in certain circumstances, as affirmed in Roe v. Wade25 and subsequent 
decisions, is indelibly woven into the fabric of wrongful birth or wrongful life 
claims,26 this Comment is not meant to be a wide-ranging indictment of 
abortion.27  Nor is the Comment intended to focus solely on Down syndrome.  
Down syndrome, also known as trisomy 21, is one of many genetic disorders 
that can be diagnosed in utero but cannot be “cured” in any clinical sense.28  
The specific mention of Down syndrome in the recent ACOG Practice 
 
 22. Prenatally Diagnosed Condition Awareness Act of 2007, H.R. 3112, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(as introduced in House, July 19, 2007). 
 23. 154 CONG. REC. H9918–20 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008). 
 24. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374, 
122 Stat. 4051 (2008) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8). 
 25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 26. See Hummel v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341, 1346 (N.J. 1992).  In fact, wrongful birth and 
wrongful life claims were brought before Roe.  See id. at 1343 (citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 
A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967)); see generally Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the 
Answer to the Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 191–96, 191 n.15 (1993) 
(providing a history of pre-Roe wrongful life and wrongful birth claims).  The number and 
success of such claims, however, has drastically increased since Roe was decided.  See generally 
Belsky, supra, at 191 (supporting the argument that judicial decisions concerning wrongful life 
and wrongful birth actions “have followed a clear course paralleling the progression of the 
constitutional right to practice birth control and procure abortions”). 
 27. For a discussion of the moral and social implications of the legal right to abortion as 
opposed to actions for wrongful birth and wrongful life, see for example, Hensel, supra note 3, at 
171–81 (arguing that although “[a] woman’s right to reproductive freedom includes the right to 
make unpopular choices regarding the future of her pregnancy,” selective termination and 
wrongful birth and wrongful life actions have distinct moral and social implications); Adrienne 
Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 315, 340 (2003); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 439, 457–58 (2003) (suggesting that allowing parents the choice to terminate a 
pregnancy if the fetus is found to have a congenital disability does not send the message to 
“persons with those conditions or disabilities that their lives are not valued or that it would be 
preferable that they had not been born,” as some scholars have argued). 
 28. Down syndrome, or trisomy 21, is a condition that occurs from three copies of the 
twenty-first chromosome. 
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Guidelines,29 its mention in Section 191.923 of the Missouri Code,30  and in 
the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act,31 and the 
staggering abortion rate for fetuses diagnosed with Down syndrome,32 place 
certain emphasis on this condition and make it particularly ripe for discussion 
in the arena of prenatal testing and disability rights. 
Rather, this Comment seeks to honestly discuss the impact the tort actions 
of wrongful birth and wrongful life—both premised as they are on the 
assertion that a fetus would have been aborted had the parents known of the 
fetus’ congenital condition—have on the disabled community and on society at 
large.  Scholars have predicted the onset of defensive medicine as a result of 
wrongful birth and wrongful life actions.33  Arguably, ACOG’s recent Practice 
Guidelines represent such defensive medicine, insofar as it militates towards a 
standard of care without sufficient guarantees that expectant parents are 
receiving adequate information and counseling.  This Comment attempts to 
explore the subsequent impact defensive medicine may have on informed 
consent and proposes some legislative solutions to eliminate the threat of legal 
action via wrongful birth and wrongful life actions and to further ensure 
accurate, non-directive genetic counseling. 
Part I of this Comment evaluates some of the historical models of 
disability and their impacts on legal approaches to disability law.  Part II 
discusses the flaws in the tort actions of wrongful birth and wrongful life and 
the equally flawed impact these actions have had on the current state of genetic 
counseling for expectant parents of a child with a disability.  Part III discusses 
the new ACOG Practice Guidelines, the response of some disability groups to 
these Practice Guidelines, and some expected ramifications of the Practice 
Guidelines.  Part IV will discuss several legislative solutions to the current 
legal climate, including some frameworks for barring wrongful birth and 
wrongful life actions as well as a discussion of both the recently passed 
Missouri legislation and the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions 
Awareness Act.  Part V will propose a more informed decision-making process 
for expectant parents of a child with a disability, one that is in accord with the 
goals and promises of the ADA, and that guarantees that all expectant parents 
of a child diagnosed with a disability have access to the necessary information 
and non-directive counseling. 
 
 29. ACOG 77, supra note 14, at 217. 
 30. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.923 (Supp. 2008). 
 31. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374, 
122 Stat. 4051 (2008) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8). 
 32. Cambria, supra note 16. 
 33. See generally Sheth, supra note 6, at 665 (“[A]llowing tort claims like wrongful birth 
and wrongful life may encourage physicians to practice defensive medicine . . . . For example, . . . 
[ordering] all available diagnostic tests in an effort to avoid liability for potentially exorbitant 
compensatory damages, regardless of the cost or need for the diagnostic test.”). 
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I.  HISTORICAL MODELS OF DISABILITY 
The use of interdisciplinary materials to influence legal issues and 
outcomes is one of the great triumphs of the past few decades of legal 
history.34  One need only look to cases such as Brown v. Board of Education35 
to affirm this statement.  Only recently, however, have legal scholars begun to 
incorporate such interdisciplinary materials into a discussion of disability 
related discourse.36  Because disability legal theory is a relative latecomer to 
embrace the value of such interdisciplinary discourse, a review of the historical 
models of disability is useful to evaluate the development of disability law.  
These models “provide the foundation for deconstructing the images and 
conceptions of disability that motivate the case law on wrongful birth and 
wrongful life.”37 
The medical model of disability has dominated and continues to dominate 
much of public thinking about impairment and disability.38  The essence of this 
model is that disability is a trait that results from the internal functional 
limitations of an individual.39  Because disability is viewed as mainly a 
medical issue, “[p]hysicians serve as the gatekeepers of disability” and “[i]t is 
an unstated assumption that the medical community can precisely identify 
impairments and accurately assess functionality.”40  This model essentially 
echoes the familiar phrase that “biology is destiny.”41  Importantly, “[s]ince 
society did not cause the social disadvantages that flow naturally from biology, 
it is under no obligation . . . to alleviate them . . . . [and] any remediation 
society chooses to undertake falls under the heading of charitable intervention 
rather than entitlement.”42 
Not surprisingly, the medical model’s focus on disability as biology leads 
to the conclusion that the solution to disability is similarly biological.43  Social 
policy focuses on “eliminat[ing] as much disability as possible, by using 
medical technology to cure existing disability or prevent future disability . . . , 
 
 34. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 145. 
 35. 347 U.S. 483, 493, n.11 (1954) (relying, in part, on evidence from social science 
research to conclude that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional). 
 36. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 627 
(1999). 
 37. Hensel, supra note 3, at 146. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Crossley, supra note 36, at 649. 
 40. Hensel, supra note 3, at 146. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 146–47. 
 43. Id. at 147. 
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and . . . us[ing] rehabilitative techniques to help disabled individuals 
approximate dominant physical standards as closely as possible.”44 
Genetic counseling that fails in its stated goal of being non-directive thus 
both reflects and reinforces the medical model of disability.  Parents who are 
not presented with “timely and informative counseling,” which includes 
“current information about the conditions that were tested for, the accuracy of 
such tests, and resources for obtaining support services for such conditions”45 
are done a disservice at the hands of years of public thinking about disability 
that fails to recognize that disability is more than simply a medical condition to 
be either cured or prevented.  Wrongful birth and wrongful life tort suits 
“broadcast the medical model’s message of the biological inferiority and 
‘otherness’ of impaired individuals.  Disability is reinforced as an inherent 
personal trait, and biology, once again, becomes destiny.”46 
By contrast, the social model of disability contends that disability is, at 
least in part, “a social construction shaped by environmental factors.”47  As 
opposed to the medical model, which focuses on the inherent physical 
limitations of individuals, the social model “asserts that ‘disability’ is not 
caused by impairment but by the social barriers . . . that people with 
impairments . . . come up against in every arena.”48  A classic example would 
be an individual in a wheelchair who cannot enter a building constructed with 
stairs.  Such an individual is “disabled vis-à-vis the building not because of any 
physiological limitation, but because of a design flaw that did not contemplate 
the non-ambulatory.”49  The important consequence of such thinking is that 
 
 44. Crossley, supra note 36, at 652 (footnotes omitted); see Hensel supra note 3, at 147.  
While it is certainly not the contention of this Comment that all medical professionals view 
disability in this manner, there is support for the view that the medical profession approaches 
disability, at least partially, in this manner.  For example, Steven J. Ralston, Reflections from the 
Trenches: One Doctor’s Encounter with Disability Rights Arguments, in PRENATAL TESTING 
AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 334, 335 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000), observes: 
I cannot comment on all doctors’ medical training because it varies from medical school 
to medical school.  In general, what I was taught in medical school and in my training is 
that disability—no matter what its form—is a bad thing and to be avoided at all costs.  
Lectures or seminars on Down syndrome or other genetic syndromes were geared toward 
the description of the abnormalities and the efforts that can be made to prevent the 
problem in the first place; that children with congenital diseases may find their lives to be 
rich and valuable was hardly recognized, much less stressed. 
 45. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.923.3 (Supp. 2008). 
 46. Hensel, supra note 3, at 175 (footnotes omitted). 
 47. Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214 (2000). 
 48. C. Thomas, Disability: Getting It “Right,” J. MED. ETHICS, 15, 15 (2008); see also 
Hensel, supra note 3, at 147–48 (discussing the social model of disability). 
 49. Hensel, supra note 3, at 148. 
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“assumptions of the inability to participate become self-fulfilling 
prophecies.”50 
There are admittedly limitations to the social model of disability.  It is true 
that some individuals have severely limiting conditions that exist 
independently of any social construction of disability.  The social model, 
though, “need not deny that some limitations flow directly from impairment in 
order to argue that externally imposed disadvantages should [nonetheless] be 
remedied.”51  Indeed, one need only look to a typical wrongful birth or 
wrongful life suit to realize that powerful external social barriers remain to 
prevent full acceptance of people with disabilities into society. 
An important attribute of the social model of disability is that, not 
surprisingly, the remedy is also social in nature.52  By contrast to the medical 
model, public policy response to disability is not to “cure” the defects of the 
individual, but to “understand the disablist social relationships and forces 
(individual and collective) that work both to directly socially exclude and to 
undermine psychoemotional well-being of adults and children with 
impairments.”53 
A more recent theory of disability, referred to as the civil rights or minority 
group model of disability, views disability primarily as a function of social 
relationships and discrimination rather than inherent functional limitations, and 
uses this recognition as the foundation of a group identity for people with 
disabilities.54  Because to view disability as “unique and personal . . . implies 
that it is an essentially private problem to be resolved, conquered or overcome 
by individual effort rather than by public policies or social services,” the 
minority model eschews this line of thinking.55  By encouraging the view that 
disability is a socially generated notion, “individual impairments take a back 
seat to the universal experience of discrimination and stigmatization.”56  
Because under this model “individuals with disabilities are encouraged to see 
themselves as members of a discrete minority group,” this model “transforms 
relatively powerless individuals into a unified political body insistent on the 
‘eradication of exclusionary practices and structures as a matter of civil 
rights.’”57 
 
 50. Scotch, supra note 47, at 215. 
 51. Crossley, supra note 36, at 658. 
 52. Thomas, supra note 48, at 15–16. 
 53. Id. at 16. 
 54. Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and 
Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 101 (1994); see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 
149 (discussing the minority group model of disability). 
 55. Hahn, supra note 54, at 105. 
 56. Hensel, supra note 3, at 149. 
 57. Id. (quoting Crossley, supra note 36, at 659). 
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Many scholars have credited passage of the ADA, in part, to the political 
awareness borne out of the minority model of disability.58  Scholars have 
argued that “Congress adopted a civil-rights model for addressing disability 
issues by using the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a foundation for drafting and 
interpreting the ADA.”59  Wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits are 
particularly unacceptable when viewed through the lens of the social or 
minority model of disability.  Similarly, when expectant parents are unduly 
influenced to either undergo prenatal testing or terminate a pregnancy because 
of a diagnosed disability, the goals of the social and minority models of 
disability are directly undermined. 
II.  WRONGFUL BIRTH AND WRONGFUL LIFE SUITS 
A. The Origins and Expansion of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Suits 
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits are a “unique subset of medical 
malpractice claims arising from a defendant’s negligent failure to inform 
potential parents of the risk that their offspring may suffer from a congenital 
defect.”60 
In Becker v. Schwartz, the plaintiff mother gave birth to a child with Down 
syndrome.61  The mother “alleged that her physician neither advised her of the 
increased risk of [bearing a child] with birth defects [for] women over thirty-
five years of age nor recommended that she have an amniocentesis.”62  The 
actionable injury in the parents’ wrongful birth suit was thus their lost choice 
of whether or not to carry the unborn child to term, given their hypothetical 
knowledge that the child would be impaired.63  The parents also filed a 
wrongful life action on behalf of their child.64  The operable injury in the 
wrongful life tort action was the child’s life itself.65  The legal theory in the 
wrongful life suit was that the child asserted he would not have been born but 
for the doctor’s failure to recommend an amniocentesis or fully inform the 
parents of their chances of bearing a child with a genetic condition.66  The 
 
 58. Id. at 150 & n.48. 
 59. Sheth, supra note 6, at 654. 
 60. Id. at 644. 
 61. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d, 807, 808 (N.Y. 1978).  The court described Dolores 
Becker as “a retarded and brain-damaged infant who suffers, and will continue to suffer for the 
remainder of her life, from Down’s Syndrome, commonly known as mongolism.”  Id.; see also 
Hensel, supra note 2, at 156–58 (discussing Becker and other early wrongful birth and wrongful 
life cases). 
 62. Hensel, supra note 3, at 156; see Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 808–09. 
 63. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 813. 
 64. Id. at 809. 
 65. Id. at 812. 
 66. Id. 
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court took the approach that is currently endorsed by many jurisdictions: to 
deny the wrongful life claim67 and allow the wrongful birth claim to go 
forward.68 
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits are essentially an outgrowth of 
“wrongful conception” or “wrongful pregnancy” claims.69  Such claims “were 
[usually] brought by parents against either physicians who had performed 
negligent sterilization procedures . . . or manufacturers who had developed 
faulty contraceptive products.”70  In such a situation, “the defendants’ 
negligence resulted in the birth of a healthy child despite the parents’ clearly 
expressed desire to avoid conception.”71  Tort actions of this type have been 
widely accepted in most jurisdictions, in large part because they “are consistent 
with traditional medical malpractice and product liability actions” insofar as 
“the plaintiff can easily establish that, but for the physician’s negligence, the 
child . . . would not have been conceived.”72 
In such cases, courts have typically “awarded the plaintiff mothers their 
medical expenses and emotional distress damages associated with pregnancy 
and childbirth.”73  The majority of courts, however, “have rejected the 
expansion of such damages to the costs of raising the unexpected child to 
adulthood,” usually because to do so would require courts to “label[ ] the 
child’s life, rather than the mother’s experience as a legally compensable 
‘injury.’”74 
Medical advances allowing for sophisticated prenatal diagnosis of certain 
disabilities “coupled with the loosening of the fetters on abortions triggered in 
1973 by Roe v. Wade,”  have given rise to the tort actions of wrongful birth and 
wrongful life.75  In wrongful birth suits, the essence of the claim is that the 
parents “would have aborted their unborn child had the impairment been 
properly diagnosed.  The injury identified . . . is the parents’ lost choice over 
whether or not to carry [the disabled] child to term.”76  Wrongful life suits are 
 
 67. Id.; see Hensel, supra note 3, at 161 n.118 (listing jurisdictions that have rejected 
wrongful life claims). 
 68. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 813; see Sheth, supra note 6 at 650 n.59 (listing jurisdictions that 
have allowed wrongful birth claims). 
 69. Hensel, supra note 3, at 151. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Hensel, supra note 3, at 151; see, e.g., Simmerer v. Dabbas, 733 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 
(Ohio 2000) (noting that “[m]ost United States jurisdictions recognize this cause of action”). 
 73. Hensel, supra note 3, at 151. 
 74. Id. at 151 & n.53 (listing cases that have refused to label the child’s life as an “injury” 
thus refusing to provide plaintiff-mothers damages for child-rearing expenses). 
 75. Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1115 (Md. 2002) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973)); see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 160 (describing the development of wrongful birth and 
wrongful life claims). 
 76. Hensel, supra note 3, at 142–43. 
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necessarily connected to wrongful birth suits.  Because these suits are initiated 
in the child’s name, the context of the suit is changed, and different 
implications are raised.77  In a typical medical negligence action, of course, the 
disability caused by a physician is identified as the harm in the tort model.78  In 
wrongful life suits, because the physician’s “alleged negligence did not 
actually cause the child’s impairment, but instead enabled the child to come 
into being, the operable injury is the child’s life itself, with non-existence 
identified as the preferred alternative.”79 
Only four jurisdictions currently allow wrongful life suits.80  Courts that 
have rejected wrongful life suits have usually done so either by reasoning that 
life with a disability is better than no life at all, therefore that life cannot 
constitute an injury at law;81 by finding that damages are incalculable;82 or by 
recognizing that public policy dictates rejection of the tort.83  By contrast, 
twenty-three jurisdictions recognize wrongful birth claims84—claims that are 
arguably equally as damaging to the disability rights movement.85  One 
explanation for the divergent treatment of these torts is that “courts have found 
it more palatable to identify lost parental choice as the injury than to answer 
the metaphysical question of whether non-existence is ever preferable to life, 
however burdened.”86 
The distinction between wrongful birth and wrongful life actions on the 
grounds that the injury identified in a wrongful birth action is simply lost 
choice, though, is largely an example of how much of the debate surrounding 
wrongful birth and wrongful life actions has become “camouflaged by the 
rhetoric of reproductive choice.”87  Because wrongful birth torts are reserved 
for the births of children bearing congenital conditions, any distinction 
 
 77. See id. at 144 (arguing that the issues raised by each claim are fundamentally the same). 
 78. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. 1978). 
 79. Hensel, supra note 3, at 143 (emphasis added). 
 80. See id. at 162 n.122 (listing cases from California, New Jersey, and Washington that 
have recognized wrongful life suits); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (2005).  But see Turpin 
v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982). 
 81. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 161 n.119 (listing cases that have refused to find that being 
born in and of itself is a “legally cognizable injury”). 
 82. See id. at 161 n.120 (listing cases where courts have concluded that damages are 
incalculable). 
 83. See id. at 161 n.121 (listing cases that note policy reasons for rejecting wrongful life 
claims). 
 84. See Sheth supra note 6, at 650 & n.59. 
 85. Hensel, supra note 3, at 145 (“Even though the courts have treated the two torts 
differently, they are analytically similar and lead to equally problematic anti-therapeutic 
consequences.”). 
 86. Id. at 143. 
 87. Sheth, supra note 6, at 660. 
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between wrongful birth and wrongful life actions on the basis of lost choice is 
disingenuous.88  As disability rights scholar Wendy Hensel has pointed out: 
In [wrongful birth] cases, it is not lost choice in the abstract that is actionable, 
but the lost opportunity to abort the impaired child or to prevent conception.  
As in wrongful life cases, the embodiment of the mother’s injury is the child 
with defects who exists in the wake of the physician’s negligence, but here this 
message arises by implication rather than as a fundamental element of the 
cause of action.  It is precisely because of this subtlety, however, that wrongful 
birth merits even more exacting scrutiny than wrongful life.  The misleading 
rhetoric of choice and opportunity has allowed the tort of wrongful birth to 
garner widespread legal recognition, but has obscured its anti-therapeutic 
consequences.89 
Given the wrongful birth and wrongful life actions’ unique focus on the child’s 
congenital condition, is the standard tort model truly appropriate? 
B. The Wrongful Reasoning and Harmful Results of Wrongful Birth and 
Wrongful Life Actions 
While many scholars contend that wrongful birth and wrongful life suits fit 
comfortably within traditional tort principles,90 there seem to be at least a few 
significant distinctions between these suits and a traditional tort suit.  “First, 
wrongful birth and wrongful life [suits] broaden the traditional element of 
proximate cause” almost beyond recognition.91  Both these actions are, of 
course, premised on the condition that the parents would have chosen abortion 
over birth of their child.  The plaintiff parents in a wrongful birth or wrongful 
life suit, though, simply cannot assert that the physician is the proximate cause 
of the birth condition.92  The physician did not cause the child to have any 
genetic impairment, nor could she have given the child a life free from the 
congenital condition with which she was born.93 
Wrongful birth and wrongful life claims also differ significantly “from 
traditional negligence claims because they involve two specific and unique 
comparisons.”94  Wrongful birth and wrongful life claims require (1) a 
comparison between the value of a child with a disability and the value of a 
 
 88. See, e.g., 23 CAUSES OF ACTION SECOND, supra note 9, § 4, at 55 (“Wrongful birth 
actions are brought by parents to recover for the birth of an unhealthy child.  The parents’ right to 
recover is based on the defendant’s negligent deprivation of the parents’ right not to conceive the 
child or to prevent the child’s birth.” (emphasis added)). 
 89. Hensel, supra note 3, at 166–67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 90. Id. at 143 n.14 (listing works by various scholars who suggest that wrongful life and 
wrongful birth tort claims correspond with “traditional negligence principles”). 
 91. Sheth, supra note 6, at 646. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 647. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] COUNSELING FOR PARENTS OF A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY 1299 
child born free of diagnosable impairment, and (2) a comparison between the 
value of a life with a disability and nonexistence itself.95 
First, the claims require a comparison between the value of a child with a 
disability and the value of a child born free of impairment.  As Hensel has 
noted: 
The rationales courts use both to award and to deny recovery for “normal” 
children stand in contrast to those articulated by jurisdictions recognizing 
wrongful birth or wrongful life in the context of a child born with a genetic 
defect.  While courts give heavy emphasis to the inherent benefits of rearing a 
child in the former, many courts ignore these benefits in the latter.96 
This is despite evidence that many families find life with a child with a 
disability to be a positive experience.97 
Second, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims also require a comparison 
between the value of a life with a disability and nonexistence itself.98  In other 
words, because there is nothing a health care provider could have done to give 
the child a nondisabled life, “it appears inconsistent with basic tort principles 
[of compensation] to view the injury for which defendants are legally 
responsible solely by reference to plaintiff’s present condition without taking 
into consideration the fact that if defendants had not been negligent she would 
not have been born at all.”99 
As one court put it: 
The sanctity of the single human life is the decisive factor in this suit in tort.  
Eugenic considerations are not controlling.  We are not talking here about the 
breeding of prize cattle.  It may have been easier for the mother and less 
expensive for the father to have terminated the life of their child while he was 
an embryo, but these alleged detriments cannot stand against the preciousness 
of the single human life to support a remedy in tort.100 
Another court has noted, “[t]he necessary inquiry is objective, not subjective; 
the court cannot avoid assessing the ‘worth’ of the child’s life.”101 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Hensel, supra note 3, at 154. 
 97. See e.g., Brian Skotko, Mothers of Children With Down Syndrome Reflect on Their 
Postnatal Support, 115 PEDIATRICS 64, 73 (2005); Patricia Bauer, Stand Tall, DOWN SYNDROME 
NEWS, Sunday, Aug. 5, 2007, at 68. 
 98. Sheth, supra note 6, at 647. 
 99. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982). 
 100. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967), overruled in part by Berman v. 
Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. 1979) (noting that unlike Gleitman, the court will recognize and allow 
compensation for mental and emotional distress in wrongful birth cases); see also Sheth, supra 
note 6, at 648–49 (discussing Gleitman). 
 101. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 174–75 & n.183 (quoting Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 353 
(1986)). 
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By devaluing the life of a child with a disability as compared to the life of 
a child without that particular disability, and by reducing the value of a child 
with a disability to below existence itself, wrongful birth and wrongful life 
claims significantly “discount, or even nullify, the value of life with a 
disability.”102  The tragedy of such reasoning is that it comes at a time when 
people with disabilities are enjoying significantly improved lives.103 
The logic and process of wrongful birth and wrongful life claims has a 
severely negatively impact on the children involved in these suits.  Courts have 
sometimes overlooked this truism by accepting the logic that reimbursing 
parents for the medical and educational expenses they may incur in raising a 
child with a disability is a positive and appropriate response to the birth of a 
child with a disability.104  In essence, courts have “fail[ed] to see how the 
parents’ recovery of extraordinary medical and educational expenses, so as to 
minimize the detrimental effect of the child’s impairment, is outweighed by 
any speculation about stigma that he might suffer.”105  Far from being 
speculative, though, the societal stigma reinforced by the testimony and 
reflected by the suit itself is the very real result of his or her parents’ testimony 
in open court that they would have aborted the child had they known of his or 
her congenital condition.  This testimony is necessary to establish the causation 
required by the tort model—some “parents have even sought to introduce their 
children as [demonstrative] exhibits in litigation.”106 
It is not difficult to see that “[s]uch testimony is emotionally crippling not 
only to the child suffering from physical or mental infirmities, but also to the 
larger disability community that seeks equality of opportunity and full 
participation, both of which are goals supported by the ADA.”107  As opposed 
to “outweighing” any perceived damage to the child with a disability, awarding 
damages to an individual plaintiff is itself debilitating to the disability rights 
movement.  This is because along with the delivery of damages to an 
individual litigant comes the demoralizing message that an individual with a 
disability is inherently deficient—so deficient, in fact, that his or her life may 
constitute an injury at law.108  Simply put, the obvious implication of wrongful 
 
 102. Sheth, supra note 6, at 648 (citing Phillips v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 537, 543 
(D.S.C. 1980); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12–13 (N.J. 1979)). 
 103. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 97. 
 104. See Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1208 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (finding that 
plaintiffs were entitled to prove and recover medical and educational expenses in a wrongful birth 
action). 
 105. Id. at 1207. 
 106. Hensel, supra note 3, at 172 & n.174; see also Thornhill v. Midwest Physician Ctr., 787 
N.E.2d 247, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (finding that it was within the circuit court’s discretion to bar 
plaintiff-parent from using her child as a “demonstrative exhibit” in litigation). 
 107. Sheth, supra note 6, at 660. 
 108. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 143–54, 151. 
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birth and wrongful life suits is that this child should not be alive.  As Hensel 
has noted, “any benefits that wrongful birth and wrongful life actions secure 
for the individual plaintiff come at a cost of demeaning and demoralizing anti-
therapeutic messages delivered to the community of people with disabilities 
and to greater society.”109 
C. The Perceived Benefits Do Not Outweigh the Harms 
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits are often justified on two main 
grounds: “(1) they establish a means to deter negligent conduct by health care 
providers” and thereby preserve parental autonomy; and “(2) they compensate 
parents and children for injuries or losses sustained as a result of this negligent 
conduct.”110 
There are, however, many strong arguments against the use of wrongful 
birth and wrongful life suits as means to deter negligence among health care 
providers.  For starters, Darpana Sheth has argued that “allowing tort claims 
like wrongful birth and wrongful life may encourage physicians to practice 
defensive medicine, which could lead to increases in the cost of healthcare.”111  
An example of defensive medicine would be to order “all available diagnostic 
tests in an effort to avoid liability for potentially exorbitant compensatory 
damages, regardless of the cost or need for the diagnostic test.”112  ACOG’s 
most recent Practice Guidelines offering “practical recommendations for 
implementing Down syndrome screening in practice,”113 arguably, represent 
such defensive medicine and are discussed below in Part III. 
Moreover, the health care provider’s duty of care—her duty to provide 
expectant mothers with accurate information so they can decide whether or not 
to continue a pregnancy—is undermined where testing itself becomes a duty 
on the part of expectant mothers, and the existence of these causes of action 
creates incentives, pressuring women to terminate pregnancies.  The 
unintended consequence of wrongful birth and wrongful life suits is often that 
health care providers may, in their fear of litigation, overstate the effects of 
certain disabilities and thus not provide the “informed consent” each woman is 
guaranteed.114  Courts have openly expressed concern “that physicians, 
uncertain of the distress parents might feel about bearing a child with genetic 
abnormalities, would resort to recommending abortion, fearing a wrongful 
 
 109. Id. at 164. 
 110. Sheth, supra note 6, at 664; see also Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1114 (Md. 
2002); Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 811 (N.J. 1999). 
 111. Sheth, supra note 6, at 665. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See ACOG 77, supra note 14, at 217. 
 114. See Stephanie S. Gold, An Equality Approach to Wrongful Birth Statutes, 65 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1005, 1039 (1996); see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 168–71. 
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birth lawsuit.”115  One need not look far for examples of such situations.  A set 
of parents, thinking their child had one disability, exercised their right for a 
selective abortion, only to discover their child had a completely different 
disability.116  Another set of parents received a telephone call informing them 
that their child had a genetic impairment; in the same phone call, they were 
reassured that the doctor had already scheduled the abortion for the next day.117 
“Under such circumstances, what exactly is the meaning of informed 
consent?”118  Some have argued that selective abortions in the atmosphere 
under which information is currently presented to women offer less of a 
choice, and more of a mandate: 
The new technology of prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion offers new 
choices, but it also creates new structures and new limitations on choice.  
Because of the society in which we live, the choices are inevitably couched in 
terms of production and commodification, and thus do not move us to see new 
levels of genuine choice.119 
Defensive medicine, insofar as it may place excessive pressure on a woman to 
have an abortion, frustrates rather than enhances a woman’s right to informed 
procreative choice. 
Adrienne Asch, a disability rights scholar and staunch pro-choice advocate, 
has noted, as defensive medicine becomes the standard, disability rights 
advocates’ fears will be realized that “it will be very difficult for most families 
to consider bringing children with diagnosable disabilities into the world if 
they know that the society believes that their births should have been 
prevented.”120  Parental autonomy demands that “at least the decisions [to have 
eugenic abortions] will be those of the people ultimately raising children, and 
not society, in the form of its insurance carriers and clinicians as 
gatekeepers.”121  Social pressure, like defensive medicine, drains parental 
autonomy.  The argument that wrongful birth and wrongful life actions 
actually promote parental autonomy is thus inaccurate and misleading. 
It is worth noting as well, that the low correlation between the incidence of 
medical negligence and associated lawsuits indicates that there is little 
evidence to show that malpractice suits actually target and reduce medical 
negligence.122  Because relatively few patients injured by medical malpractice 
 
 115. McEntire, supra note 8, at 778 (citing Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. 
1985)). 
 116. RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS 130 (1999). 
 117. KIM KLUGER-BELL, UNSPEAKABLE LOSSES 86 (1998). 
 118. RAPP, supra note 116, at 130. 
 119. BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY 14 (1986). 
 120. Asch, supra note 27, at 340. 
 121. Id. at 339. 
 122. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory 
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1616 (2002). 
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ever actually sue, and because “many malpractice lawsuits are brought and 
won by patients even though expert reviewers can identify no evidence of 
negligent care,” there is little evidence that such suits provide any real 
deterrence to future acts of negligence.123  The particularly low correlation 
between the incidence of children born with a congenital condition and the 
incidence of wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits seems to further weaken 
the argument that these suits truly serve any deterrent purpose.124 
Furthermore, if medical negligence is really the issue addressed by 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, there are other mechanisms that have 
been proven more effective.  Mandatory specialized training in the field of 
genetic testing for obstetricians, gynecologists, and primary care physicians 
involved in prenatal testing would be one such solution.  Section 191.923 of 
the Missouri Code mandates: 
When a prenatally diagnosed condition, including but not limited to Down 
Syndrome, becomes known as a result of one or more prenatal tests, the 
physician or other health care professional who requested or ordered prenatal 
tests . . . shall provide the patient with current information about the conditions 
that were tested for, the accuracy of such tests, and resources for obtaining 
support services for such conditions.125 
This seems a far more rational way to promote informed consent than adopting 
and adapting tort models to a situation that requires parents to avow, in open 
court, that they would have aborted their child had the physician fully informed 
them of their fetus’ genetic condition.  Further, legislative mandates such as 
these reach the people intended—all expectant parents of children with 
congenital conditions—rather than the few who choose to pursue 
compensation through tort action.126  Disciplinary action by state medical 
licensing boards and increased federal and state regulation of laboratories that 
conduct genetic testing are other alternatives to reducing medical 
negligence.127 
The second reason often offered in defense of wrongful birth and wrongful 
life suits—that they compensate parents and children for injuries or losses 
sustained as a result of a health care provider’s negligent conduct—is similarly 
inaccurate and deceiving.128  Advocates of the system argue that these claims 
operate “as a type of supplemental insurance that spreads such financial 
hardships to parties who are more likely to be able to bear the cost.”129  This is 
 
 123. Id. at 1618. 
 124. Id.; see also Sheth, supra note 6, at 665. 
 125. MO. REV. STAT. 191.923.3 (Supp. 2008). 
 126. See Sheth, supra note 6, at 665. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 666. 
 129. Id. 
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inaccurate, though, because the focus of a wrongful birth or wrongful life suit 
is not the individual or family’s need for financial assistance.130  States have 
entirely differed in their application and valuation of damages and the amount 
of recovery they have allowed for wrongful birth and wrongful life suits.131  
Thus, these claims “may provide substantial, but unnecessary, financial 
support to some families and provide no relief to other families with 
compelling need for financial support.”132 
More importantly, financial recovery is neither available to all parents who 
bear children with disabilities nor to all children born with such disabilities.  
Rather, “recovery is limited to cases where parents testify that they would have 
aborted the child or where children testify that they should have been 
aborted . . . . ‘[O]nly to those willing to openly disavow their self-worth and 
dignity.’”133  In the words of Darpana Sheth, “[b]y compensating those who 
devalue children with congenital defects and denying recovery to those who 
embrace these children, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims create a 
perverse system that sends a negative message about the value of life with 
disability.”134 
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits may promote an unhealthy attitude 
toward disabilities, escalate physician liability, and promote defensive 
medicine.  None of these results happen in a vacuum.  As societal values shift, 
national advisory groups and physician practice groups such as the ACOG 
respond to insulate themselves from liability, the amalgam of interests 
implicated by these suits may coalesce to form policy prescriptions that are not 
optimal for society. 
III.  ACOG PRACTICE GUIDELINES 
In January 2007, the ACOG published Practice Guidelines setting forth a 
new set of guidelines for testing for certain congenital conditions.135  These 
Practice Guidelines are ACOG’s recommendations to all practicing 
obstetricians and gynecologists in the United States and are “designed to aid 
practitioners in making decisions about appropriate gynecological care.”136  
Thus, they are very influential and affect the everyday procedures of 
physicians across the country.  The stated goal of this bulletin was to “offer 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 160; see also Sheth, supra note 6, at  650–53. 
 132. Sheth, supra note 5, at 666. 
 133. Id. (quoting Hensel, supra note 3, at 171). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See ACOG 77, supra note 14. 
 136. Id. at 217. 
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practical recommendations for implementing Down syndrome screening in 
practice.”137 
There are currently a variety of prenatal screening and testing medical 
techniques available to obstetricians and their patients.  There are ways to 
obtain fetal tissue samples by amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling and 
to test these tissue samples for genetic conditions such as Down syndrome.138  
These tests, though, fall under the category of “invasive” tests.139  These 
techniques carry a certain, not insignificant, amount of risk to the fetus, and for 
that reason, it is “not . . . appropriate to examine every pregnancy this way.”140 
As a result, screening tests have been developed to try to identify those 
pregnancies at “high risk.”141  Screening tests are not as invasive.142  However, 
they are more likely to be wrong.143  Screening tests do not provide definite 
confirmation that a fetus has a certain condition.144  Screening tests provide an 
adjusted estimate of the chances a certain fetus bears a certain condition.145  
“There are ‘false-positives’ or ‘screen-positives’ ([when a] test states the 
patient [or fetus] has the condition when the patient really doesn’t) and ‘false-
negatives’ ([when a] patient [or fetus] has the condition but the test states 
he/she doesn’t).”146 
“Because the [chance] of having a baby with Down syndrome [rises] above 
the 1 in 250 mark [at age 35] for women,” the typical standard of care for the 
last twenty-five years or so was “to offer the screen for Down syndrome to all 
mothers 35 years and older.”147  This changed in January 2007, due to the 
ACOG Practice Guidelines.148 
The essence of the January 2007 ACOG Practice Guidelines is that 
“[i]deally, all women should be offered aneuploidy screening before 20 weeks 
of gestation, regardless of maternal age” and “[s]creening and invasive 
diagnostic testing for aneuploidy should be available to all women who present 
for prenatal care before 20 weeks of gestation regardless of maternal age.”149 
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 138. Len Leshin, Prenatal Screening for Down Syndrome, 23 J. PERINATAL MED. (1995), 
http://www.ds-health.com/prenatal.htm. 
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 148. See ACOG 77, supra note 14, at 217. 
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This clinical recommendation was welcomed with less than enthusiasm by 
many in the disability community, and understandably so.  When this new 
development is combined with the knowledge that the abortion rate for fetuses 
with Down syndrome amongst mothers who have had prenatal testing hovers 
between eighty to ninety percent, it is not difficult to see that “what is 
antiseptically called ‘screening’ for Down syndrome is, much more often than 
not, a search-and-destroy mission” that will result in an abortion.150  Though 
stated in clinically neutral terms, “the implicit message the American College 
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists seems to be sending is this: even though 
racial, cultural and ethnic diversity are valued and supported in our society, 
genetic diversity is not.  It seems that it’s more important to be ‘normal’ than 
to be ‘human.’”151 
The National Down Syndrome Society (NDSS), a nonprofit organization 
with more than 200 affiliates nationwide representing the more than 350,000 
Americans with Down syndrome and their families, responded to ACOG’s 
recommendations with a resolution containing two call-to-action points: 
[First,] [c]hallenging and strongly encouraging health care professionals 
and organizations like ACOG to partner with NDSS and other Down syndrome 
organizations to ensure the wide-spread proliferation of balanced, accurate and 
up-to-date information to expectant parents; and 
[Second,] [u]rging health care professionals, policymakers, and the Down 
syndrome community to work together to ensure that expectant parents are not 
unduly influenced to undergo prenatal testing or to terminate a pregnancy after 
receiving a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome.152 
The National Down Syndrome Congress (NDSC) condemned the ACOG 
recommendations on the grounds that they “convey tacit approval for 
terminating pregnancies where the fetus has Down syndrome.”153  The NDSC 
cited several concerns.  The main concern, of course, was that “[t]he primary 
medical reason for first trimester screening is to encourage earlier diagnostic 
testing in ‘at risk’ pregnancies, in order to facilitate early terminations.  Other 
reasons for prenatal diagnosis, such as hospital selection and delivery 
management, do not require first trimester testing.”154 
 
 150. George F. Will, Golly, What Did Jon Do?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2007, at 72. 
 151. Bauer, supra note 97, at 70. 
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Another concern was that “the recommended screenings [would] produce 
numerous false positives, potentially leading to unnecessary patient distress 
and possible termination of pregnancies where medical concerns do not 
exist.”155  For instance, “[a]pproximately 65% of pregnant women seeking 
prenatal care received Maternal Serum Alpha-Fetoprotein (MSAFP) screening 
by the early 1990s.”156  The MSAFP screen, though, has high false positive 
rates and the “vast majority” of women who receive abnormal results carry 
fetuses without abnormality.157  According to the American Pregnancy 
Association, as many as one in twenty women tested will receive abnormal 
MSAFP results, while only a range of one in sixteen to one in thirty-three 
women receiving these abnormal results actually carry a fetus with a birth 
defect.158  Therefore, ninety-four to ninety-seven percent of the women who 
are told something may be wrong based on MSAFP results are carrying a fetus 
that does not have any of the defects that MSAFP screens.159 
As prenatal testing has become more routine, the “manner of obtaining 
consent for the tests, the delivery of test results, and the decision-making 
process that follows” have all been impacted.160  One significant change is that 
obstetricians often handle the brunt of the prenatal testing responsibilities, 
where prior this was done largely by geneticists.161  This could potentially 
threaten informed consent because “obstetricians often lack the training in non-
directiveness given to genetic counselors and may unabashedly recommend or 
encourage testing.”162  Accordingly, one recommendation of the NDSC was 
that: 
All screening and diagnostic tests need to be fully explained to patients, who 
should be provided the opportunity to decline or give their informed consent 
for testing.  If patients decline certain tests, physicians and other medical 
personnel should respect the individual’s wishes and not overtly or covertly 
pressure patients to undergo undesired screenings.163 
When “obstetricians . . . fail [to explain] to patients . . . the purpose or 
limitations of screening tests, such as when an obstetrician incorporates 
screening tests as standard care, patients [may be] surprised and confused 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Angela M. Hannemann, Comment, A New Routine: Assisting Patients in Responding to 
Prenatal Diagnosis, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 337, 337 (2006). 
 157. Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 252 
(2002). 
 158. Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, Maternal Serum Alpha-Fetoprotein Screening (MSAFP), 
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/prenataltesting/afp.html (last visited June 22, 2009). 
 159. See id. 
 160. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 341. 
 161. Suter, supra note 157, at 242. 
 162. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 341. 
 163. Press Release, Nat’l Down Syndrome Cong. supra note 153. 
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[when told of] abnormal results.”164  For example, “[p]hysicians have routinely 
described MSAFP screening . . . as ‘a simple blood test [to see] how [the] baby 
is developing.’”165  Under such circumstances, “[a] woman is likely to 
‘consent’ . . . without understanding” the full consequences of her actions, 
without considering “whether she wants the information the test provides, or 
[without] being aware of the test’s accuracy limitations.”166  Importantly, the 
result of this state of affairs could be that “[t]his same directiveness and lack of 
information may permeate the entire decision-making process as patients 
determine whether to test further and whether to continue pregnancy.”167 
Others in the disability community were similarly disenchanted with 
ACOG’s recommendations and the ramifications of the new policy.  An entire 
population of people—a population that is “increasingly finishing high school, 
living more independently and holding jobs”—was seemingly being 
devalued.168  At least one court has noted that “[e]very recent study shows that 
people afflicted with Down’s Syndrome can lead useful, productive, and 
meaningful lives—that they can be educated, that they are employable, that 
they can form friendships and relationships and can get along in society.”169  
As Patricia Bauer has noted: 
What’s gone undiscussed in the news coverage of the guidelines seems to be a 
general assumption that reasonable people would want to screen for Down 
syndrome.  And since nothing can be done to mitigate the effects of an extra 
21st chromosome in utero, the further assumption is that people would be 
reasonable to terminate pregnancies that are so diagnosed.170 
Many worried that, in an era of wrongful birth and wrongful life suits and 
increasing emphasis on early screening, it had become “better for business to 
deliver only babies that the medical profession calls ‘good outcomes.’”171  
Emphasis on clinical outcomes and avoidance of lawsuits had inadvertently led 
one researcher to theorize that the ACOG and the doctors it represents: 
have embarked upon the elimination of an entire class of people who have a 
history of oppression, discrimination and exclusion. . .[and] in the process 
[young parents] are giving away much of what defines America at its best: a 
society that assumes responsibility for those who are vulnerable, a society that 
 
 164. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 341 (citing Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the 
Culture of Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 990 (1996)). 
 165. Id. (second and third and alterations in original) (quoting Andrews, supra note 164, at 
990). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Patricia E. Bauer, The Abortion Debate No One Wants to Have, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 
2005, at A25. 
 169. Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d  1102, 1123 (Md. 2002). 
 170. Patricia E. Bauer, What’s Lost in Prenatal Testing, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2007, at B7. 
 171. Bauer, supra note 97, at 70. 
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accepts those who are different, a society marked by generosity, liberty and 
freedom of thought.172 
One side effect of the drastically increased number of fetuses with 
disabilities being aborted would be the necessarily decreased pool of peers for 
persons born with disabilities.  Another fear of disability rights advocates was 
that ACOG’s Practice Guidelines would lead to a state of affairs where 
abortion of a fetus with a disability became the standard of care.  This is hardly 
an impractical fear given the current abortion rate of fetuses with Down 
syndrome.173  Asch has pointed out that “enumerating a set of testable genetic 
diseases tells people who currently have those conditions that it would be 
better if prospective parents went to considerable lengths to prevent the births 
of children with those conditions.”174 
In such an environment, it would not be unimaginable that insurance 
companies could begin to deny coverage for babies with Down syndrome and 
other disabilities because their parents had failed to comply with accepted 
standards of care.  At least one HMO has openly contemplated “withdraw[ing] 
medical coverage for a woman who could have avoided the birth of a child 
with cystic fibrosis if she had ‘chosen’ to abort the pregnancy after the prenatal 
diagnosis was made.”175 
Indeed, in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,176 an early California 
case to accept a wrongful life claim, the court acknowledged in dicta that its 
reasoning would support a cause of action by an impaired child against his 
parents for inflicting an “injury” by choosing to give birth.177  “In the court’s 
view, if parents made a conscious and informed choice to carry a seriously 
impaired child to term, nothing should ‘protect [them] from being answerable 
for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought on their 
offspring.’”178  Though the California legislature stepped in to insulate parents 
from such liability,179 the mere mention of such an action shows that it is not 
inconceivable that states could honor such a claim in the future.  If ACOG’s 
recommendations are seen as evidence that eugenic abortion has truly become 
the “standard of care,” it would certainly seem to increase the likelihood of 
such a potential claim. 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 339; Will, supra note 150, at 72. 
 174. Asch, supra note 27, at 339. 
 175. Abby Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and 
Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 35 (1991). 
 176. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 177. Id. at 488; see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 159–60. 
 178. Hensel, supra note 3, at 159 (alteration in original) (citing Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 
488). 
 179. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 2007); see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 159–60. 
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As selective abortion becomes more the rule than the exception, a refusal 
to abort a fetus with a disability “may be considered a personal assumption of 
the risk of all of the struggles and hardships that follow the child’s birth.”180  
Insurance considerations aside, disability is thus transformed from a societal 
issue into an individual concern, undermining all work of the disability rights 
movement.181  Under such circumstances any cohesive civil rights view of 
disability would collapse back into medical model thinking and “society’s 
assessment of the individual’s worth will be limited to the capability of current 
medical techniques to identify and correct impairments.”182 
Furthermore, while the ACOG recommendations are certainly intended to 
reduce the number of lawsuits directed at gynecologists and obstetricians, they 
invariably increase the potential pool of plaintiffs who can allege that a 
physician has breached his or her duty to the mother.183  Because the standard 
of care is now to recommend screening tests for all women, rather than just 
women over thirty-five, the potential pool of plaintiffs who can allege that a 
physician has breached his or her duty to the mother is vastly increased.184  For 
instance, in Becker v. Schwartz,185 the plaintiff-mother had to prove that the 
standard of care for a mother of her age was to be informed of her risk of 
bearing a child with Down syndrome.186  Now, any potential mother bearing a 
child with Down syndrome who was not informed of her chances of bearing 
such a child may be able to show that a physician has potentially breached her 
duty simply by reference to the ACOG’s Practice Guidelines. 
Due in large part to the work of disability rights groups, ACOG issued 
another monthly bulletin in December 2007, urging that “[a]fter the diagnosis 
of a chromosomal abnormality, the patient should receive detailed information, 
if known, about the natural history of individuals with the specific 
chromosomal finding.”187  The bulletin also urged that patients be referred to a 
genetic counselor, clinical geneticist, or groups such as the NDSS and NDSC 
upon screening or definite results that their fetus has a genetic condition.188 
 
 180. Hensel, supra note 3, at 179–80. 
 181. ROTHMAN, supra note 119, at 9. 
 182. Hensel, supra note 3, at 181. 
 183. See Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 563 (Ga. 1990) 
(“[W]ith the continued advances in medical science which are occurring daily, the problems 
presented by the concept of ‘wrongful birth’ actions can only become increasingly more 
numerous and more complex.”); see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 142. 
 184. See ACOG 77, supra note 14, at 217.  The vast majority of children, including children 
with Down syndrome, are born to mothers under the age of thirty-five. Will, supra note 150. 
 185. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). 
 186. Id. at 811, 813 
 187. ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 88: Invasive Prenatal Testing for Aneuploidy, 109 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1459, 1464 (2007) [hereinafter ACOG 88]. 
 188. Id. 
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While it is certainly laudable that ACOG would reach out to disability 
rights groups to help promote informed consent and proper genetic counseling, 
this does not alter the fact that the accepted standard of care in current 
medicine is to urge any means possible to identify a fetus with Down 
syndrome or select other fetal chromosomal abnormalities.  This begs the 
question: Where is the line drawn between an “acceptable” and an 
“unacceptable” disability?  Or, in legal parlance, between a non-actionable and 
an actionable disability?189  Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits have been 
raised in instances of children born with Tay-Sachs disease, Down syndrome, 
and congenital blindness, to name a few.190  Within the range of diagnosable 
congenital conditions, it seems a slippery slope to begin labeling certain 
conditions beyond hope.191 
Particularly troubling is that, at the time a disability is diagnosed, the only 
information that can be accurately communicated to parents is the 
identification of the disability and perhaps some expected parameters of the 
disability.192  To categorize certain disabilities as actionable but others as non-
actionable thus ignores the variation within a given disability.  The testing only 
tells physicians and mothers that a fetus has a certain trait; it cannot predict 
how severely or mildly that trait will be represented in the child.193  Success 
stories abound for disabilities as various as Down syndrome,194 cystic 
fibrosis,195 and spina bifida.196  Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits thus 
ignore the potential richness of a life with a disability.197  Essentially, “[t]he 
individual is the impairment, and the value of existence is judged on that basis 
alone.”198 
The problem of differentiating between actionable and non-actionable 
conditions is again raised surrounding the issue of late-onset diseases.  
“Huntington’s Disease, for example is a . . . debilitating and fatal condition that 
 
 189. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 182–83. 
 190. Id. at 181–82 & nn.219–21 (listing cases for each respective condition). 
 191. See e.g., id. at 181–90 (discussing the problem of “line drawing”). 
 192. Id. at 183. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 183 & n.227; see e.g., Priscilla Anderson, Down’s 
Syndrome: Cost, Quality and Value of Life, 53 SOC. SCI. & MED. 627 (2001) (detailing interviews 
of people with Down syndrome discussing the quality of their lives). 
 195. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 183 & n.228 (“[A] child with cystic fibrosis ‘might die from 
it, survive with physical disability, or suffer no noticeable impairment’”) (quoting Edward J. 
Larson, The Meaning of Human Gene Testing for Disability Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 913, 922 
(2002))). 
 196. See Alison Davis, Yes, the Baby Should Live, 31 NEW SCIENTIST 54 (1985).  Davis, who 
has spina bifida, writes, “Despite my disability and the gloomy predictions made by doctors at my 
birth, I am now leading a very full happy and satisfying life by any standards.”  Id. 
 197. Hensel, supra note 3, at 183. 
 198. Id. (emphasis added). 
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begins in adulthood,” but which can now be detected prenatally.199  Would 
such a condition justify a jury verdict declaring the person’s life a compensable 
damage?200  Such a claim has not been raised yet, but would not stray too far 
theoretically from a typical wrongful birth or wrongful life action.  When one 
takes into account that the life expectancy of individuals with Huntington’s 
disease is less than for individuals with Down syndrome, and that expenses 
associated with Huntington’s disease far outweigh those associated with Down 
syndrome, the application of wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits to 
certain disabilities and not others seems particularly arbitrary and 
irresponsible.201 
With an accepted standard of care that currently targets a population of 
people who may live rich and fulfilling lives, and with the ability to diagnose a 
myriad of disorders—including late-onset disorders—it seems a scary 
proposition to have state-sanctioned lawsuits declaring people’s lives to be 
legally compensable injuries.  It is thus necessary and proper for legislative 
bodies to step in and protect the interests imperiled by wrongful birth and 
wrongful life lawsuits. 
IV.  LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
A. Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions Should Be Left to the 
Legislative Branch 
State legislatures should pass legislation to preclude wrongful birth and 
wrongful life causes of action.  The legitimacy of wrongful birth and wrongful 
life actions, even if not defeated by the ADA, is more properly resolved by the 
legislative branch.  The statutory approach in states that have chosen to pass 
legislation regarding wrongful birth and wrongful life actions is to disavow 
both actions.202 
 
 199. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 184; Suter, supra note 157, at 237 (“With the rapid 
identification of numerous genes through the Human Genome Project, scientists began to isolate 
genes associated with late-onset conditions.”). 
 200. See  Hensel, supra note 3, at 185 & n. 237.  The question raised, of course, is whether a 
portion of a rich and fulfilling life can be offset by avoidable (via abortion) pain and suffering.  
Some scholars have compared and contrasted wrongful birth and wrongful life cases with right-
to-die cases.  See, e.g., Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in “Wrongful Life” Actions, 42 
Hastings L.J. 505, 548 (1991).  To the extent that right-to-die issues are raised by the question 
posed, this is not the intent of the author.  Such questions far exceed the scope of this Comment. 
 201. See generally Suter, supra note 157. 
 202. See Sheth, supra note 5, at 652 n.71; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (1986) 
(precluding actions claiming “person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but 
would have been aborted”); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (1998) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 145.424 (1993) (banning wrongful birth and wrongful life claims alleging a child would have 
been aborted); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.130 (2000) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (1993) 
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Missouri is one of the states to take initiative in rejecting both wrongful 
birth and wrongful life actions.  Section 188.130 of the Missouri Code 
provides that: 
1. No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages 
on behalf of himself or herself based on the claim that but for the negligent 
conduct of another, he or she would have been aborted. 
2. No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages 
based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would 
have been aborted.203 
The two portions of this provision are intended to apply to wrongful life and 
wrongful birth causes of action, respectively. 
Only one state has passed legislation approving of wrongful birth and 
wrongful life actions.204  Nine, however, have disapproved of these causes of 
action.205  This is in stark contrast to the number of states that have accepted 
some form of wrongful birth action via judicial approval.206  It seems a fair 
question to ask: Why the discrepancy? 
Some courts have come to the conclusion that the legislature is the more 
appropriate place for debate and decisionmaking, especially when dealing with 
questions that have such broad implications for society.207  If, after the robust 
public debate encouraged by the legislative format, many states have decided 
to preclude wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of action, it would seem to 
indicate that some of the twenty-three jurisdictions that have allowed these 
causes of action via judicial approval might also decide to ban wrongful birth 
and wrongful life tort actions. 
In four of the nine states that have prohibited wrongful birth and wrongful 
life causes of action, the statutes have never been challenged.208  Of cases that 
 
(precluding wrongful life actions); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(B) (1993) (precluding 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims alleging that “a person once conceived would not or 
should not have been born”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (1987) (banning wrongful life); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1993) (banning claims alleging that a person would not have been 
permitted to have been born alive but would have been aborted); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 600-2971 (West 2004) (banning both wrongful birth and wrongful life actions). 
 203. MO. REV. STAT. § 188.130. 
 204. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (2000); see also Thibeault v. Larson, 666 A.2d 
112 (Me. 1995) (interpreting section 2931 to authorize recovery of damages for wrongful birth). 
 205. See sources cited supra note 202. 
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 61–68; see also Sheth, supra note 6, at 650 n.59. 
 207. See e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978); see also supra Part II. 
 208. Julie F. Kowitz, Note, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes Barring Claims 
for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 235, 256–57 (1995).  The four states are Idaho, Indiana, 
North Dakota, and South Dakota. Id. n.106.  Utah has only one case arising under its statute, and 
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have challenged the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting wrongful birth and 
wrongful life statutes, the claim is that these statutes unduly burden a woman’s 
access to an abortion.209  No such challenge has thus far been successful.210 
Courts have typically rejected constitutional challenges to statutes barring 
wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of action either by reasoning that the 
statute’s effect does not constitute state action211 or that the statute’s bar on 
these causes of action does not affect the right to terminate a pregnancy.212  
While it is certainly important that wrongful birth and wrongful life actions not 
be legislatively prohibited for the express purpose of restricting a woman’s 
access to an abortion, courts have thus far rejected such analysis.213  The logic 
of denying such a challenge seems to hold up.  A ban on wrongful birth and 
wrongful life actions—brought after a child’s birth—has seemingly no effect 
on a woman’s access to prenatal services such as an abortion.214 
 
the opinion explicitly states that it does not consider the constitutionality of the statute.  C.S. v. 
Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988). 
 209. See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1993). 
 210. See, e.g., Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986); Wilson v. 
Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo.banc 1988); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985); 
Edmonds v. W. Pa. Hosp. Radiology Assocs., 607 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
 211. See, e.g., Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 10 (finding lack of state action and therefore no 
constitutional violation); Edmonds, 607 A.2d at 1083 (upholding statute based on lack of state 
action). 
 212. See, e.g., Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14 (stating that the statute barring wrongful birth suits 
“does not directly interfere with the woman’s right to choose a safe abortion”); Edmonds, 607 
A.2d at 1087 (concluding that statute “neither regulates nor directly affects [abortion] rights”). 
 213. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 10; Edmonds, 607 A.2d at 1087. 
 214. According to Darpana M. Sheth, 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims may violate Title II of the ADA in three respects.  
First, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims discriminate against individuals protected 
by the ADA, namely the children [involved in the actions] . . . . Second, . . . these causes 
of action discriminate against [the children involved in the lawsuits] on the basis of their 
disabilities . . . . Third, judicial and legislative recognition and state enforcement of 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims constitute discrimination by a public entity. 
Sheth, supra note 6, at 655.  That wrongful birth and wrongful life suits may violate the ADA 
does not appear to have been litigated at this point, but may in the future present a persuasive 
argument that these suits are void as in violation of the ADA.  See id. at 655–64.  But see Kowitz, 
supra note 208 (arguing that “statutes barring wrongful life and wrongful birth actions absolutely 
contradict the principles of informed consent espoused in Casey” and that under the statutory safe 
harbor physicians might be more likely to withhold information regarding “the health of the 
fetus” which “is so integral to informed choice that its omission substantially obstructs a woman’s 
right to choose abortion”). 
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B. State and Federal Legislation Is Necessary to Establish Informed Genetic 
Counseling 
It is now nationally recognized that there is a vast deficiency in data 
needed to better “understand the epidemiology of prenatally diagnosed 
conditions, to monitor trends accurately, and to increase the effectiveness of 
health intervention.”215  The reason for such a deficiency is undoubtedly due to 
the unique confluence of factors discussed in this Comment. 
Recognizing that “[t]he extent and quality of the information provided to 
patients both before [prenatal] testing and upon delivery of the test results is a 
matter of critical importance because these results demand decisions 
concerning whether to abort, proceed with further tests, plan for adoption, or 
make special birth arrangements,”216 Missouri passed legislation regarding 
prenatal testing and women’s access to counseling.217  Section 191.923 of the 
Missouri Code states that “pregnant women who choose to undergo prenatal 
screening should have access to timely and informative counseling about the 
conditions being tested for, the accuracy of such tests, and resources for 
obtaining support services for such conditions.”218 
The rationale of Section 191.923 of the Missouri Code is that  “[i]nformed 
consent is a critical component of all genetic testing and prenatal screening . . . 
and the counseling that follows may lead to the unnecessary abortion of unborn 
humans with Down syndrome or other prenatally diagnosed conditions.”219  
The legislation implicitly recognizes that “directiveness and lack of 
information may permeate the entire decision-making process”220 if a 
concerted effort is not made at the very beginning of the process to honor and 
promote informed consent. 
In the modern legal setting, including the availability of wrongful birth and 
wrongful life suits, physicians are very aware that the “clearest evidence of 
compliance is to have a patient take the test . . . prompt[ing] many healthcare 
professionals, at a minimum, to encourage . . . screening.”221  Legislation thus 
may be necessary to counter this impulse to practice defensive medicine. 
 
 215. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, S. 1810, 110th Cong. 
§ 2(a)(2) (2007) (as introduced in the Senate, July 18, 2007) (enacted as Prenatally and 
Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 4051 (2008) (to 
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8)); accord Prenatally Diagnosed Condition Awareness Act of 
2007, H.R. 3112, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2007) (as introduced in House, July 19, 2007). 
 216. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 338. 
 217. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.923 (Supp. 2008) (introduced as H.B. 818, 94th Gen. Assem. 
(Mo. 2008)). 
 218. § 191.923.1. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 341. 
 221. Suter, supra note 157, at 253. 
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Section 191.923 of the Missouri Code and the Prenatally and Postnatally 
Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, by making informed consent the focal 
point of the legislation, 222 recognize the tendency toward defensive medicine 
and promote an entire process that is instead permeated by non-directiveness 
and support.  Missouri’s legislation states, more specifically: 
When a prenatally diagnosed condition, including but not limited to Down 
Syndrome, becomes known as a result of one or more prenatal tests, the 
physician or other health care professional who requested or ordered prenatal 
tests . . . shall provide the patient with current information about the conditions 
that were tested for, the accuracy of such tests, and resources for obtaining 
support services for such conditions.223 
The statute goes on to establish support services such as “a clearinghouse of 
information concerning supportive services providers, information hotlines 
specific to Down Syndrome or other prenatally diagnosed conditions, resource 
centers, education, other support programs for parents and families, and the 
alternatives to abortion services program under [Missouri law].”224 
The Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act 
offers many of the same resources.225  The legislation calls for “the expansion 
and further development of the National Dissemination Center for Children 
with Disabilities,”226 “the establishment of a national registry . . . of families 
willing to adopt newborns with Down syndrome or other prenatally or 
postnatally diagnosed conditions,”227 and “the establishment of awareness and 
education programs for health care providers who provide, interpret, or inform 
parents of the results of prenatal tests for Down syndrome or other prenatally 
or postnatally diagnosed conditions.”228 
In keeping with its emphasis on informed consent, the legislation mandates 
that upon receipt of a positive prenatal or postnatal diagnosis,229 parents be 
 
 222. See Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, S. 1810, 110th 
Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2007) (as introduced in the Senate, July 18, 2007) (“Informed consent is a 
critical component of all genetic testing.”). 
 223. § 191.923.3. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act sec. 3, § 399R(b)(1). 
 226. Id. § 399R(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 227. Id. § 399R(b)(1)(B)(iv). 
 228. Id. § 399R(b)(1)(B)(v). 
 229. While it has gone largely undiscussed during the course of this Comment, there is 
certainly great room for improvement regarding the state of affairs surrounding postnatal 
diagnosis of congenital condition and the subsequent delivery of this news to new parents.  See 
Skotko, supra note 97, at 73.  Skotko concludes with ten recommendations for health care 
professionals: (1) “[T]he person to deliver postnatal diagnosis should be a physician,” (2) 
obstetricians “should coordinate their messages with neonatologists and pediatricians,” (3) 
diagnoses “should be delivered once the mother is settled and as soon as a physician suspects the 
diagnosis,” (4) “whenever possible, the physician should make the announcement with both 
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provided “[u]p-to-date, evidence-based, written information concerning the 
range of outcomes for individuals living with the diagnosed condition, 
including physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial 
outcomes.”230 
The legislation further requires that the Government Accountability Office 
later “submit report[s] . . . concerning the effectiveness of current healthcare 
and family support programs serving as resources for the families of children 
with disabilities.”231 
CONCLUSION 
That we are being propelled in the direction of Brave New World is obvious.  
But no less obvious is the fact that we can, if we so desire, refuse to co-operate 
with the blind forces that are propelling us.  For the moment, however, the 
wish to resist does not seem to be very strong or very widespread.232 
The availability of wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits has led to a 
situation where the legal climate of America has great sway over physician 
practices.233  For example, in the 1970s, ACOG’s legal department began 
advising that obstetricians use the newly minted technology of Alpha-
Fetoprotein screening kits in order to provide a legal defense to any actions 
brought against them for the birth of a child with a defect.234  The routinization 
of prenatal testing and the use of “testing as a standard of care has been largely 
rooted in legal rather than medical necessity.”235  In such a climate, it is not 
difficult to see that ACOG’s most recent Practice Guidelines are at least in part 
due to the increased liability that directly results from wrongful birth and 
wrongful life tort actions.  Thanks to the human genome project, prenatal 
screening tests are available earlier in pregnancies and are available to 
diagnose more disorders.236 
 
parents present in a private setting,” (5) “when delivering [a diagnosis], the physician should first 
congratulate the parents on the birth of their child and should not forget to talk about the positive 
aspects” of the congenital condition diagnosed, (6) health care professionals should keep their 
personal opinions to themselves,” (7) “mothers should be provided with up-to-date printed 
materials,” (8) “parents should be provided access to other families who have children with” the 
same congenital condition, (9) “after the initial diagnosis . . . , parents should be offered a private 
hospital room,” and (10) “all physicians should be cognizant of the realities and possibilities of” 
modern day life with the diagnosed congenital condition.  Id. at 74–76. 
 230. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act sec. 3, § 399R(c)(1)(A) 
(emphasis added). 
 231. Id. § 399R(d). 
 232. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED, 23–24 (1958). 
 233. See Hannemann, supra note 156, at 342. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 142 & n.5. 
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As Asch has noted, “[p]romoting informed reproductive choice may be the 
stated goal of test developers, but the generally expected and desired result of a 
disability diagnosis is the termination of that particular pregnancy in hopes that 
the next one will yield an embryo or fetus free of a detectable trait.”237  Thus, 
society seems to have determined that it is more worthwhile and efficient to 
“‘solve’ problems of disability by prenatal detection and abortion, rather than 
by expending those resources in improving” conditions for members of the 
community with disabilities.238 
ACOG’s most recent Practice Guidelines “offer practical recommendations 
for implementing Down syndrome screening in practice.”239  While clinically 
neutral, the Practice Guidelines are representative of a larger and disturbing 
trend: the devaluation of the lives of the disabled.  This societal trend is evident 
not only by the continued acceptance of wrongful birth and, in fewer 
jurisdictions, wrongful life actions, but also by the implicit acceptance of 
eugenic abortions. 
The ACOG Practice Guidelines will form the crux of how prenatal 
screening tests will be used by physicians around the country.  Are there 
appropriate safeguards in place to ensure that expectant mothers who agree to 
prenatal testing have done so with full, informed consent?  Evidence seems to 
indicate that with the system currently in place, this question must be answered 
in the negative.240  Are women who choose to abort a fetus with a congenital 
condition doing so with full, accurate information and after appropriate non-
directive counseling?  The current abortion rate for fetuses with Down 
syndrome juxtaposed with the 214 family-long waiting list to adopt a child 
with Down syndrome241 seems to indicate to this author that there is a 
fundamental disconnect between the information presented to women 
following a prenatal diagnosis of a congenital condition and the actual 
potential of these individuals.  The full potential of many people with such 
congenital conditions to live a rich and fulfilling life and to bring joy to those 
around them seems too often to be overlooked. 
Legislation is necessary to remedy this disconnect.  Missouri’s tort reform 
to protect health care providers from wrongful birth and wrongful life actions 
is a model that should be duplicated by other states.  While national legislation 
 
 237. Asch, supra note 27, at 336 (quoting Adrienne Asch, Why I Haven’t Changed My Mind 
About Prenatal Diagnosis: Reflections and Refinements, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY 
RIGHTS supra note 44, at 234, 240). 
 238. Id. at 333. 
 239. See ACOG 77, supra note 14, at 217. 
 240. See Andrews, supra note 164, at 974–75; Suter, supra note 157, at 256. 
 241. Will, supra note 150 (“At least 85 percent of pregnancies in which Down syndrome is 
diagnosed are ended by abortions.”); see also 151 CONG. REC. S2982 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2005) 
(statement of Sen. Brownback) (“For some conditions that can be detected in the womb, such as 
Down Syndrome, we are aborting 80 percent or more of the babies who test positive.”). 
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banning such causes of action is unlikely,242 there is a strong argument that 
statutes and judicial decisions allowing wrongful birth and wrongful life 
actions violate the ADA.243  In addition, state legislators who wish to make 
their states friendlier for obstetricians to practice and who recognize the 
damage done to people with disabilities and to society’s conception of 
disability by these tort actions should enact legislation similar to Section 
188.130 of the Missouri Code to eliminate the legal threat posed by wrongful 
birth and wrongful life suits and to reinforce the equality for citizens with 
disabilities promised by the ADA. 
With the recent ACOG Practice Guidelines, federal legislation modeled on 
Section 191.923 of the Missouri Code is necessary to ensure that informed 
consent is a prerequisite to prenatal testing and that any genetic counseling 
upon diagnosis of a congenital condition is done in a non-directive manner.  
The Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, signed 
into law in October 2008 by President Bush, will help to ensure that a pregnant 
woman never “feel[s] that her options are limited by a lack of public support 
for the types of social services that could help her, her family, and her 
baby.”244 
MATTHEW DIEHR* 
 
 242. While it is true that many pro-choice scholars oppose wrongful birth and wrongful life 
actions for reasons presented throughout this Comment, this does mean the issue has become de-
politicized.  While no challenges to state legislation banning wrongful birth and wrongful life 
actions on the grounds that such legislation unduly burdens a woman’s right to an abortion have 
been successful, these challenges surely have not escaped the notice of the U.S. Congress.  While 
the author would certainly advocate this national legislation, it is unlikely that Congress would 
attempt to pass such legislation.  See discussion supra Part IV.B; see also Liz Townsend, Pro-Life 
News in Brief, NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Nov./Dec. 2008, http://www.nrlc.org/news/ 
2008/NRL11/BriefNews.html.  Townsend quotes Senator Brownback as saying, in reference to 
the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, “President Bush signed into 
law a bill that will help an untold number of expecting parents who learn that their unborn child 
may be born with a disability . . . . This is a great victory for the culture of life we should all seek 
to promote.”  It is evident, then, that even the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions 
Awareness Act—certainly less controversial than any federal attempt to ban wrongful birth and 
wrongful life suits—overcame its share of partisan hurdles on its way to passage. 
 243. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 244. 151 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan). 
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